When does starting the car become “driving”?

At Mackrell Marsh & Co, we understand that criminal law often hinges on nuanced interpretations of legal terms. A recent Court of Appeal decision, OFM [2026] EWCA Crim 599, has brought fresh clarity to the question of what constitutes “driving” under the Road Traffic Act 1988. This case, which arose from a tragic incident, underscores the complexities of criminal liability in road traffic offenses.

The Case: A Tragic Incident and a Legal Question

The case involved a fatal accident in which a six-month-old child was struck by a car. The respondent, standing outside the vehicle and leaning through the driver’s door, turned the ignition key to start the engine. Unexpectedly, the car moved forward, leading to the tragic outcome. Crucially, the respondent did not intend to move the vehicle, did not enter it, and had no practical ability to control it once it began moving.

At trial, the judge ruled there was no case to answer on two counts: causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs. The judge held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the respondent had been “driving” at the time of the incident.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision: Redefining “Driving”

The prosecution appealed, and the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to review the legal definition of “driving.” The court emphasized that the test is not solely about whether the individual was in effective control of the vehicle at every moment. Instead, the court highlighted two key considerations:

1. Substantial Control: The individual must have substantial control over the vehicle’s movement and direction.
2. Ordinary Meaning of Driving: The conduct must align with the ordinary understanding of “driving.”

The court determined that starting a car’s engine by turning the ignition key is an act that ordinarily forms part of driving. It involves the use of one of the vehicle’s principal controls and cannot be dismissed as incidental or unrelated to driving. Importantly, the court rejected the argument that the respondent ceased to be the driver simply because he was in a position where he could not effectively control the vehicle once it moved.

A Question for the Jury

The Court of Appeal concluded that whether the respondent’s actions amounted to “driving” was a question for the jury to decide. It ruled that a properly directed jury could reasonably find that the act of starting the engine in these circumstances constituted driving, even though the respondent did not intend for the car to move.

As a result, the appeal was allowed, leave to appeal was granted, and the case was ordered to resume in the Crown Court.

Implications for Criminal Law

This decision has significant implications for road traffic offenses and the interpretation of “driving” under the law. It highlights that actions commonly associated with driving, such as starting a car’s engine, can carry legal consequences even in unexpected circumstances. The ruling also reinforces the principle that questions of fact, such as whether an individual was “driving,” are often best left to a jury.

How Mackrell Marsh & Co Can Help

At Mackrell Marsh & Co, we specialize in navigating the complexities of criminal law, including road traffic offenses. If you are facing charges or need legal advice, our experienced team in Brighton & Hove is here to provide expert guidance and representation. Contact us today to discuss your case and explore your options.

This case serves as a reminder of the importance of understanding the legal definitions and implications of everyday actions. If you have questions about how this decision might affect you, don’t hesitate to reach out to our team.